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B. Witherspoon/Witt Standard
The standard for questioning members of the venire with regard
to their opinions of the imposition of the death penalty at the time of
Stamper's trial was set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968). Witherspoon stands for the proposition that a prospective
juror cannot be excused from jury service on the basis of her scruples
against imposition of the death penalty unless (1) she would automati-
cally vote against death without regard to the evidence, or (2) her
attitude would prevent the making of an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt. That standard was subsequently modified in Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Witt allowed exclusion of
prospective jurors when their beliefs regarding capital punishment,
either way, would substantially impair their ability to follow their
instructions and render a fair and impartial verdict.
The lower standard should disqualify a greater number of jurors
with reservations about the death penalty. It should also make it easier
for defense attorneys to exclude potential jurors on the basis of their
pro-death inclinations. Even under Witherspoon, however, jurors
who are irrevocably pro-death are not qualified to sit. The Virginia
Supreme Court has recognized that "the process of selection of an
impartial jury permits elimination for cause of those veniremen who
are biased in favor of the death penalty under all circumstances as well
as those who are biased against its imposition under all circum-
stances." Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 659, 283 S.E.2d
212, 216 (1981). Stamper was unsuccessful in urging that his counsel
was ineffective for failure to explore this possibility.
It is important to remember, though, that the "reverse Witt"
inquiry to identify jurors who are substantially impaired by their
views from considering evidence supporting a life sentence should be
undertaken as a part of every capital jury selection process. Defense
counsel should make such challenges at trial and not wait for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under habeas. Denial of a
"reverse Witt" challenge for cause at trial is a better appellate issue
than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the
challenge or undertake "reverse Witt" examination.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn
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FACTS
A Virginia jury convicted Edward B. Fitzgerald of capital mur-
der in the commission of, or subsequent to, a rape. Virginia Code §
18.2-31(5). On direct appeal, both the Virginia Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction.
State collateral proceedings also failed to afford relief to Fitzgerald.
On federal collateral proceedings, the district court dismissed
Fitzgerald's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and this appeal
followed.
At the guilt phase of the trial, the principal witnesses against
Fitzgerald were his codefendant, Daniel Johnson, and a prison cellmate,
Wilbur Caviness. Fitzgerald's attorney made a specific request for
evidence relating to the credibility of the Commonwealth's witnesses.
The Commonwealth attorney refused to disclose any credibility
information, claiming that impeachment information was not discov-
erable. Although the Commonwealth's position was incorrect as a
matter of law, Giglio v. UnitedStates, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Fitzgerald's
attorney made no objection.
Fitzgerald was convicted after ajury instruction that "a person is
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." Although
this instruction shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant -
plainly a violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) -
defense counsel made no objection.
At the penalty phase, the jury sentenced Fitzgerald to death,
basing its decision on the defendant's future dangerousness "and/or"
the vileness of the murder. The trial judge asked the jury foreman
which word, "and" or "or" was a correct statement of the jury's
position. The foreman responded that the jury had found future
dangerousness or vileness. The judge sent the jury back to the jury
room to choose which factor was the basis for its decision. The jury
again stated its decision with the word "or." After the judge reinstructed
the jury, they again sentenced Fitzgerald to death, this time basing its
decision on the "vileness" factor alone.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Fitzgerald's peti-
tion, in part finding his Giglio claim procedurally barred and in part
ruling against the claim on the merits. The court also rejected
Fitzgerald's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, including the
attorney's failure to object to a Sandstrom error. Finally, the court
rejected Fitzgerald's claim that the trial judge's statements to the jury
foreman regarding the verdict form in effect directed a penalty of
death.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Giglio claim
The Fourth Circuit held that Fitzgerald's claim regarding the
Commonwealth's failure to disclose credibility information was
procedurally barred. Fitzgerald v. Thompson, 943 F.2d 463,466 (4th
Cir. 1991). The court applied the test of Coleman v. Thompson, 111
U.S. 2546 (1991), and ruled that Fitzgerald had not shown sufficient
"cause" for the default.
Caviness testified at trial that Fitzgerald had admitted killing the
victim. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked several ques-
tions to impeach Caviness' credibility. Caviness testified that he had
only one prior felony conviction, that no charges were pending
against him, and that he had been offered nothing in exchange for his
testimony. In fact, Caviness had previously been convicted of three
felonies, two more charges were pending against him, and he had
received reimbursement for expenses of testifying. The
Commonwealth's attorney made no attempt to correct the inaccurate
statements as required by Giglio.
The Fourth Circuit viewed the record as a whole, addressing the
merits of this portion of Fitzgerald's Giglio claim, and found no
"reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury." Fitzgerald, 943 F.2d at 467 (quoting United
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States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The circuit court agreed
with the state habeas court that Caviness had no intent to deceive. Id.
The court also deferred to the finding of the Virginia Court of Appeals
that the Commonwealth lacked actual knowledge of inaccuracies in
Caviness' testimony. Id.
The court addressed each uncorrected inaccuracy separately. On
Caviness' claim that he had previously been convicted of only one
felony, the court found no prejudice to Fitzgerald. The court saw no
critical difference between one and three prior felony convictions, so
long as the jury knew that the witness was a convicted felon. Id.
Similarly, the court found no prejudice in Caviness' statement that no
charges were pending against him. The court noted that Caviness did
admit that charges were pending against him at the time he was
imprisoned with Fitzgerald. Id. Finally, the court found nothing
inaccurate in Caviness' claim that his testimony was freely given
without compensation. The court found no quid pro quo in the fact
that the Commonwealth reimbursed Caviness for "minor" expenses
which he incurred due to his role as a witness. Id.
The court viewed the alleged inaccuracies as a credibility issue
only, and looked to other circumstances to determine whether Fitzgerald
had been prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure to correct them.
The court stated that the defendant had every opportunity to challenge
Caviness' credibility on cross-examination. Id. Since Caviness'
testimony was corroborated by the testimony of co-defendant John-
son, and Caviness knew facts about the crime which were not public
knowledge, the court found his credibility to be bolstered. Id. Due to
these factors, the court ruled that any inaccuracies in Caviness'
testimony did not affect the jury's verdict. Id.
The court seems to excuse the Commonwealth's error simply
because it found Caviness' testimony to be credible. This holding
narrows the rule in Giglio and prevents its application where the court
happens to believe the relevant witness. This invasion of the province
of the jury denies the defendant of a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine a witness and call that very believability into question. The
court pays lip service to the Commonwealth's duty to find out criminal
records of its witnesses, but provides no recourse for neglect of that
duty. Whenever possible, attorneys should make certain that the
Commonwealth's position regarding exculpatory evidence is on the
record. Attorneys should also include as part of the record the exact
nature of the defendant's request for exculpatory evidence. Attorneys
should further insist, through motions and objections, that the Com-
monwealth fulfill its duty to disclose criminal records of its witnesses.
In order to preserve these issues for appellate review, attorneys must
raise them at trial, assign them as error, and argue them on brief. See
Powley, Peifecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel / Sandstrom claim
The Sandstrom issue was raised for the first time on state habeas.
Since there was no objection at trial, the circuit court found that the
issue was procedurally defaulted.
Fitzgerald claimed ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") due
to his attorney's failure to object to the Sandstrom error. The court
found that Fitzgerald failed to satisfy the "prejudice prong" of Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) (holding that the sixth amend-
ment is violated where (1) an attorney's performance is deficient,
and (2) the deficient performance prejudices the defendant).
Fitzgerald, 943 F.2d at 468. See Marlowe, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 9 (1990). Fitzgerald
claimed that his attorney's failure to object to the improper instruction
deprived him of his defense that his consumption of drugs and alcohol
prevented him from forming the requisite intent. However, the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the Commonwealth that Fitzgerald could not have
been prejudiced due to the overwhelming evidence that the defendant
was capable of forming the requisite intent. Id.
Fitzgerald pointed to a line of cases applying harmless error
analysis to Sandstrom errors and concluding that the deficient instruc-
tions were not harmless. The court, however, ruled that the harmless
error test was inapplicable, since the Sandstrom issue was not raised
in a timely manner. The court applied Strickland's ineffective
assistance of counsel test and found the prejudice requirement to be
"more stringent." Id. at 469. Because other intent instructions at trial
incorporated the alcohol/drug issue, the court ruled that Fitzgerald
was not prejudiced by his attorney's error. Id.
Attorneys should note the difference between a properly pre-
served Sandstrom claim and an IAC claim for failure to object to a
Sandstrom error. When the issue has been properly preserved, the
Commonwealth has the burden to show that the error was harmless.
However, Fitzgerald illustrates that the burden belongs to the defen-
dant when a Sandstrom error is the basis of an IAC claim in a
collateral proceeding. The procedural default of Fitzgerald's Sandstrom
claim illustrates yet again the importance of alert advocacy at trial.
Attorneys should be extraordinarily careful in making objections at
trial and preserving the record.
C. Jury Charge Claim
Fitzgerald claimed that the judge's instructions prohibited the
jury from choosing a life sentence. The trial judge required the jury
to choose between aggravating factors to justify the death sentence.
Fitzgerald claimed that this requirement precluded a lesser sentence,
contrary to Virginia law. Virginia law requires the jury to consider
evidence in mitigation. Virginia Code § 19.2-264.4B. Virginia law
also requires the court to order a life sentence when the jury cannot
agree on a penalty. Va. Code § 19.2-264.4E. Virginia law further
authorizes a life sentence even if both aggravating factors are found.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Fitzgerald's claim on the trial
judge's instructions was procedurally defaulted. Fitzgerald, 943 F.2d
at 471. The state habeas trial court had dismissed the claim, and
Fitzgerald did not argue the dismissal before the Virginia Supreme
Court. The Fourth Circuit added that this issue had little merit because
a poll of the jurors indicated their unanimity. Id.
The colloquy between the trial judge and the jury indicates the
confusion of the Virginia verdict form. The suggestion of the form is
that if aggravating factors are present, the jury should impose the
death penalty. The verdict form does not indicate the jury's duty to
impose a life sentence where mitigating factors outweigh aggravating
factors, or when the jury simply does not recommend a death sentence.
Attorneys should consider requesting instructions which require una-
nimity on an aggravating factor as a prerequisite to the imposition of
the death penalty. In order to avoid the situation presented in
Fitzgerald, attorneys may also request an instruction that in the
absence of unanimity on an aggravating factor, the jury should impose
a life sentence. Finally, attorneys might request an instruction
informing the jury that, regardless of aggravating and mitigating
factors which may be present, the jury may nevertheless impose a life
sentence.
Summary and analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday
